When parliaments do not wage war: military operations abroad and constitutional frameworks by Longo, Fabio
©I
SP
I2
01
3 
1
 
The opinions expressed herein are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of ISPI. 
The ISPI online papers are also published with the support of Cariplo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Analysis	No.	227,	January	2014	
WHEN	PARLIAMENTS	DO	NOT	WAGE	WAR:	
MILITARY	OPERATIONS	ABROAD	AND	
CONSTITUTIONAL	FRAMEWORKS		
	
	
	
	
	
Fabio	Longo	
Executive	branches	of	governments	have	always	enjoyed	a	primacy	in	managing	foreign	policy	and	
waging	 war.	 However,	 in	 several	 contemporary	 constitutional	 systems	 this	 trend	 has	 been	 offset	
through	 (more	 or	 less	 effective)	 parliamentary	 powers.	 When	 looking	 at	 recent	 developments	
concerning	 the	 Syrian	 crisis,	 could	 it	 be	 that	parliamentary	prerogatives	 in	matters	of	 foreign	and	
defense	policy	are	gaining	new	momentum?		
In	 fact,	 in	 this	 area,	 the	 relations	 between	 political‐parliamentary	 forces	 tend	 to	 weigh	 in	 more	
prominently	than	existing	norms	or	constitutional	conventions,	regardless	of	the	fact	that	dissenting	
parliamentary	 positions	 are	 made	 official	 through	 parliamentary	 deliberations.	 In	 the	 last	 few	
months	 governments	 have	 continued	 to	 ask	 parliaments	 to	 “take	 it	 or	 leave	 it”,	 but	 where	
parliaments	would	have	once	taken	it,	they	have	now	decided	to	leave	it.	
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The invitation to struggle 
Edward Samuel Corwin coined an effective expression (that would later 
enjoy great fame) to describe the American Constitution as an invitation – 
addressed to the President as well as Congress – “to struggle for the 
privilege of directing American foreign policy”1. A few years later, with 
reference to the same constitutional text, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. 
defined the distribution of powers of the legislative and executive 
branches of government in international policy as “cryptic, ambiguous and 
incomplete”2. Today, in spite of a radically different domestic and 
international scenario, the situation does not appear, overall, to have 
changed significantly: the same scheme of the invitation to struggle 
remains in place3. 
In the wake of the recent crisis in Syria, it could be argued that in the 
United States it was Congress that prevailed over the President in the 
very last round of the match, forcing him to step on the brakes and delay 
plans for a military intervention. Are parliament’s prerogatives in foreign 
and defense policy matters being rediscovered? In light of the current 
fragmentation of power in foreign policy, is it reasonable to add national 
parliaments to the list of numerous actors (public and private, 
government- and non-government-related) that set the course of foreign 
policy making? Is this a general trend that is gaining ground in many 
countries?  
The balance of power 
It is clear that Corwin’s considerations also apply to constitutional 
systems other than the American one. On the one hand, it is a fact that the 
executive branch has always prevailed in foreign policy and war-related 
matters (consider John Locke’s federative power). History has 
unequivocally shown a tendency among governments and presidents – at 
times in open contrast with constitutional provisions – to exclude 
parliaments from the decisional process by virtue of their presumed 
inadequacy in dealing with diplomatic war-related matters and their 
inability to reach decisions in a timely fashion.  
On the other hand, however, in several contemporary constitutional 
systems this expansion was offset by envisaging (more or less effective) 
                                                              
1 E.S. CORWIN, The President: Office and Powers, 4th rev. ed., New York, New 
York University Press, 1957, 171. 
2 A. M. SCHLESINGER JR, The Imperial Presidency, (1973), Boston, Mariner 
Books, 2004, 2. 
3 An interesting debate on the issue took place between Bruce Ackerman and John 
Yoo in the pages of the Los Angeles Times in April 2007: http://www.latimes.com/ 
la-op-dustup2apr02,0,2350819.story#axzz2lsykWruK. 
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parliamentary powers. In addition to their function as watchdogs of 
presidents and the executive branch of government, parliaments are 
generally also entrusted with the power to formally declare war; to 
approve major international treatises; and – through their control over 
government expenditure – to reject or to influence the allocation of the 
resources required to finance international missions4.  
It should also be noted that in this constant tension between the executive 
and the legislative branches, over the last twenty years the former has 
certainly benefitted, at least in Continental Europe, from a lexical shift 
that has diluted the term “war” into a less threatening array of 
alternatives, including “international mission” and “humanitarian 
action”5. Such terminological stratagems still lie at the heart of the matter 
and have pushed aside the relevant constitutional norms on declarations 
of war and other war-related decisions. This is the framework on which we 
are called to reflect: an invitation to struggle, a de facto extension of the 
power of the executive branch, the existence of potential parliamentary 
counter-powers, and dangerous semantic drifts.   
Military operations abroad and constitutional frameworks: a new 
paradigm?   
The earlier questions that postulate a strengthening of national 
parliaments have gained momentum in the wake of the decisions by the 
British and American executive branches to seek the approval of their 
respective legislative assemblies on the issue of military intervention in 
Syria.  
In the UK in late August Prime Minister David Cameron could only 
acknowledge the decision of the House of Commons that rejected the 
possibility of a military intervention, while across the Atlantic President 
Obama was forced to slow down the pace of the American journey to 
Damascus as the opposition of Congress became more blatant. In spite of 
their apparent similarity, the two cases are hardly comparable.  
                                                              
4 On this point, a recent reflection has come from Y. HASEBE, War Powers, in M. 
ROSENFELD – A. SAJO (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Constitutional Law, Oxford, OUP, 2012, 462-480. A comprehensive analysis in 
comparative terms on the war regulations in comparative constitutional law can 
be found in A. VEDASCHI, À la guerre comme à la guerre, Torino, Giappichelli, 
2007. 
5 G. de VERGOTTINI in Guerra e Costituzione (Bologna, il Mulino, 2004, 10) 
wrote that in normal practice war is disguised as something else. 
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In the United States the unruliness of Congress can be regarded as a 
constant in the American political scenario that becomes more marked at 
times of divided government: President Obama was particularly cautious 
because he is aware that a military intervention would not only lack 
appeal with the general public, but it would also go up against the staunch 
resistance of Congress across the political spectrum. Nevertheless, it 
would be misleading to interpret this hesitation as part of a more general 
tendency to “parliamentarize” US foreign policy as a whole. The 
impatience of the executive branch with parliamentary dynamics and 
Congressional vetoes appeared in earnest also with regard to the recent 
regulatory amendment – welcomed with great enthusiasm by President 
Obama himself – that curtailed the Senate’s control over White House 
appointments of federal officials. 
The British case is certainly more striking: what happened in 
Westminster reveals – for the first time in such clear terms – a growing 
dependence of 10 Downing Street on the whims of the majority that 
supports the Prime Minister. The reason behind Cameron’s sudden 
debacle and the – corresponding – renewed vitality of Parliament can be 
found in the nature of the coalition between the Tories and the Liberal 
Democrats that has no precedent in a country with such a solid two-party 
tradition. The element that breaks away from recent political practice 
resides not in the involvement of the legislative assembly – in the past 
other Prime Ministers had sought the support of the House of Commons in 
spite of the fact that they regarded themselves as being relatively above 
parliamentary guidelines and exclusively competent on matters of war 
powers – but rather in the outcome of the vote itself.  
There is another element that should be considered when analyzing the 
“Cameron case” vis-à-vis the events that have occurred in Washington: in 
the distribution of war powers, British constitutional conventions are 
more generous towards the executive branch than their American 
counterparts towards the US President on matters of military 
interventions abroad. 
There is no doubt that the British Prime Minister has – deliberately or 
accidentally – paved the way for a new course that will be hard to reverse 
– even for his successors - whereby military operations abroad will require 
the preventive approval of Parliament. Moreover, from now on – and even 
more so in case of a more fragmented political scenario – the outcome of 
the Parliament’s vote could hold some surprises for the British Prime 
Minister.  
There is little doubt that in matters of defense policy the relation between 
political-parliamentary powers tends to weigh in more heavily than 
constitutional norms and conventions, regardless of the fact that 
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dissenting parliamentary positions can be made official through specific 
parliamentary decisions. Clearly, the weight of the party variable that 
played such a crucial role in the two cases above can be crucial also in 
constitutional systems other than the British and the American ones.   
Deferred vetoes and “parliamentary armies”. 
In some national systems attempts were made to “bring to safety” the 
distribution of powers on matters of defense to the advantage of 
parliaments: in two countries in particular – among those closer to Italy – 
where constitutional amendments and jurisdictional activism have 
contributed to regulating in greater detail and with greater determination 
the deployment of military troops abroad.  
The first example is the recent constitutional reform in France6. Art. 35 of 
the 1958 Constitution used to state, quite simply, that A declaration of 
war shall be authorized by Parliament, while after the reform the same 
article explicitly envisages the Parliament’s authorization to extend 
military intervention by the armed forces abroad for periods of more than 
four months. This addition is certainly not a procedural revolution, 
particularly because the actual decision to intervene falls outside of the 
Parliament’s scope. It is, however, an implicit recognition of the need to 
adapt the constitution to the new forms of waging war and, at the same 
time, to reject the terminological calisthenics that were mentioned earlier 
in this paper. It is true that Parliament cannot, in fact, decide on the use 
of military power, but it is involved in (and it takes responsibility for) its 
conclusion: since 2008 the Parliament has been entrusted with a sort of 
deferred veto power. Thus the so-called domaine reservé of the President 
of the Republic has been somewhat reduced on matters of international 
policy. However, it should be noted that until today the French 
Parliament has not exercised its deferred veto power, which brings us 
back to the considerations presented in the previous paragraph on the 
primacy of the political to the detriment of the normative side.   
                                                              
6 See Loi constitutionnelle n° 2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008 de modernisation des 
institutions de la Ve République.  
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In Germany, as we know, the scenario is characterized by a highly 
structured approach that also concerns the distribution of power in foreign 
matters: the Grundgesetz envisages advanced forms of control in foreign 
and defense policy issues, regulating in detail the state of emergency, 
strengthening the position of parliament as regards the armed forces. 
Additional substantial and procedural guarantees have come from 
relevant decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court that, among other 
things, sanctioned the fundamental principle whereby all interventions by 
the armed forces are recognized as legitimate by basic law only following 
approval by the German parliament. This explains the expression 
parliamentary army, which is not that rare when referring to the German 
military. However, even in Berlin matters of foreign policy can generate 
friction between the powers that make up the majority party or the 
coalition in power– as has been the case in the past – but the legal 
framework within which the players are moving is extremely clear-cut. 
The mission in Kosovo in 1999 and subsequent military interventions 
have generated (more or less temporary) fractures both within political 
parties inside and outside the parliamentary chamber. However, unlike 
other contemporary democracies, in Germany this process developed into 
a more comprehensive reflection that took on a constitutional and political 
relevance – elections in the past two decades have hinged also on foreign 
and military policy issues. It could be argued that the caution shown by 
Chancellor Angela Merkel on the Syrian crisis was dictated, in fact, by a 
question of timing between the worsening of the crisis and Germany’s last 
electoral round. The German presence on the international scene in the 
near future will thus depend largely on the shape of the new government 
coalition.  
The Italian case and the inadequacy of the procedural process.   
Lastly, the “transit” of military policy issues before the members of the 
Italian parliament calls for some considerations. In Italy the parliament is 
the weakest link in a decisional chain that finds only an uncertain footing 
in constitutional provisions. While the executive branch is relatively 
active on the international scene, the Italian system has not yet adopted 
adequate procedural rules to enter into and exit from international crisis 
situations based on the “new” ways of waging war. The Italian system 
lacks an organic and effective legislative framework on international 
missions and as a result there is little consistency when individual cases 
are presented to parliament.   
The recently approved Code of Military Law (Codice dell’ordinamento 
militare, Legislative Decree n. 66,. 15 March 2010), that should have laid 
down some clear procedural limitations, simply provides for the Ministry 
of Defense to implement decisions on matters of defense and security that 
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are adopted by the government, submitted to the Supreme Defense 
Council and approved by parliament (art. 10). There is no reference to how 
and when parliament should be called to express its approval.   
Nevertheless, over the past twenty years the pacifist principle sanctioned 
by article 11 of the Italian Constitution has been repeatedly stretched and 
put to the test.  
The parliament’s role in making decisions of a military nature – with the 
exception of occasional and non-regulated approvals of resolutions and 
opinions addressed to the government – is therefore reduced to the 
conversion into law of measures adopted for financing or re-financing 
military missions abroad. Additionally, in the past few years the lack of an 
organic approach to regulating the matter has led to significant 
differences in the timeframe of reference of each case – that varied from 
three months to a year depending on the availability of funds.  
However, the historical trend is clear and points towards a constant and 
transversal convergence of the major forces in parliament with the 
position of the executive branch. In spite of sporadic exceptions (that in 
some cases brought the government in office to the brink of a crisis), 
international missions have always been refinanced.  
It should be noted, however, that this convergence is probably the 
consequence of the procedural impossibility of separating the political 
opportunity of each international mission from the financial one of 
supporting the deployment of troops or assisting those already in the field. 
A distinction between the two would allow the more skeptical and less 
warmongering parliamentary forces to express their political dissent on 
the option chosen by the government, without being “accused” of being 
insensitive towards the practical and equipment needs of the armed 
forces.  
In the current Italian scenario the executive branch rests on a very 
precarious balance of power: while the numbers in parliament of those 
less inclined to support international military operations are not such as 
to generate concern for the government, the hybrid nature of an executive 
– that rests entirely on a less and less cohesive group of parties – points 
towards greater caution in decisions on new military operations to be 
carried out abroad. It is against such a background that the more and 
more active role of the President of the Republic should also be considered. 
The picture painted by the media has portrayed an Italian President who, 
since the intervention in Libya, has 
stepped in and acted as if to compensate for 
such shortcomings, going so far as to secure 
the decisions of the executive on the matter 
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of modernizing the armed forces7. 
Conclusion  
It could be useful at this point to refer to an idea that is quite popular 
among analysts and advisors, whereby the parliamentarization of war 
powers is a clear indicator of the weakness of the State that is being 
considered. 
It is often argued that parliamentary dynamics are incompatible with the 
decision-making process required on foreign and defense policy issues. 
This concept should be carefully considered: it is undoubtedly true that 
the storms that rage inside parliamentary forces can translate into 
executive hesitations, as has been the case in recent times. It should also 
be noted, however, that within most parliaments – and certainly those 
considered in this paper – standing committees are generally envisaged on 
specific subject matters, which provide ideal interlocutors for the 
government on such issues. Parliamentary committees, by virtue of their 
intermediate role as restricted but representative bodies, are less crowded 
than parliamentary assemblies as a whole - and as such they are more 
inclined to discussion and compromise. Consequently they are crucial 
crossroads on the path towards a realistic parliamentarization that is 
moderate and effective regarding actions concerning foreign policy and 
military decisions. The theory of the inadequacy of parliaments could 
easily be overcome through the effectiveness of such restricted 
committees8. In the various constitutional systems, this role could acquire 
even greater prominence without overriding any perfunctory precaution 
(in 1973 Arthur Schlesinger Jr. noted that it is often unclear whether such 
committees control the executive on behalf of Congress or vice versa).   
While the recent unexpected turns of events concerning the Syrian crisis 
can be ascribed, with some caution, to a somewhat general or long-term 
trend, the reasons behind the “rediscovery of parliaments” without any 
significant changes to the constitution (except for France) can be found in 
two partially entwined elements. 
The first regards the current international scenario. For different reasons, 
when the situation in Syria seemed to call for inevitable action the 
executive branches of the countries analyzed in this paper were faced with 
parliaments that were mightily skeptical about the use of force. Rather 
than the parliamentarization of foreign policy it would be more 
                                                              
7 See on this point the press release issued by the Italian Supreme Defense Council 
on 3 July 2013: http://www.quirinale.it/elementi/Continua.aspx?tipo=Comunica 
to&key=15294. 
8 See F. LONGO, Parlamento e politica estera. Il ruolo delle commissioni, Bologna, 
il Mulino, 2011.  
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appropriate to talk about the introversion of parliaments. Once again, this 
points towards an influence of the party variable on the processes under 
analysis (and the fact that the political-parliamentary scenario is more or 
less “simplified” by electoral formulas). It is only by looking at 
cohabitation solutions in a more general sense – regarded as conditions 
that could potentially weaken the government’s unitary line – that the 
effectiveness of parliamentary control over executive power can be 
properly assessed. In recent months governments have not refrained from 
submitting to their parliaments the dry “take it or leave it” option. More 
simply, when parliaments would have once “taken it” they have now 
decided to “leave it”.  
Secondly, the impact of the economic crisis on the overall scenario has 
played a significant part. It has certainly reflected on the “introversion” of 
parliaments and on the isolationist tendency among several political 
forces, the scarce willingness to invest heavily in the military machine in 
the presence of vast economic imbalances on the internal front. In this 
sense the economic crisis and consequent domestic difficulties have 
further increased the lack of appeal of military interventions.  
Experience has also shown that the relative swiftness of decision-making 
concerning the deployment of military troops is offset by a rather 
complicated implementation of an exit strategy. It could be argued that 
until now the real weakness of constitutional and legislative frameworks 
has not concerned the entrance into armed conflicts but rather the 
difficulty of parliaments in disengaging from such conflicts.  
 
 
